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Abstract: This paper examines the association between ineffective internal control over financial 
reporting and the profitability of insider trading. We predict and find that the profitability of 
insider trading is significantly greater in firms disclosing material weaknesses in internal control 
relative to firms with effective control. The positive association is present in the years leading up 
to the disclosure of material weaknesses, but disappears after remediation of the internal control 
problems. We find insider trading profitability is even greater when insiders are more likely to act 
in their own self-interest as indicated by auditors’ weak “tone at the top” adverse internal control 
opinions and this incremental profitability is driven by insider selling. Our research identifies a 
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new setting where shareholders are most at risk for wealth transfers via insider trading and 
highlights market consequences of weak “tone at the top”. 
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Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: 
Evidence from the Profitability of Insider Trading 
 
1. Introduction 
 This study examines whether the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting 
(ICFR) is related to the profitability of insider trading. ICFR are the policies, processes, and 
procedures intended to ensure financial statements are reliable.  It is well documented in the prior 
literature that reliable financial reporting is an important mechanism used by firms to 
communicate credible information to outsiders for their use in resource allocation decisions and 
in evaluating management’s performance (see e.g., Beyer et al. 2010). When firms have 
ineffective ICFR, managers have more discretion over accounting estimates and methods due to 
the lack of formal policies and procedures that restrict managers’ accounting choices (Hogan and 
Wilkins 2008). Prior research provides evidence that firms with ineffective ICFR disseminate less 
reliable financial information (Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Feng et al. 2009).  
Prior research also demonstrates less reliable financial information enhances insiders’ 
information advantage (Lambert et al. 2007).  When insiders trade their firms’ shares based on 
private information, they are more likely to profit, i.e., extract rents from current shareholders.  
 We define the profitability of insider trading as the capital gains after purchases and the losses 
avoided by selling shares. If insiders’ trades reflect information already impounded in stock 
prices, average insider trading profitability should be zero. In contrast, insider trading 
profitability will be greater than zero when managers trade on their private information. Using a 
large sample of firms disclosing auditor-attested evaluations of ICFR effectiveness during 2004-
2008 in accordance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), we find evidence 
consistent with our main prediction: insider trading profitability is significantly higher in firms 
disclosing material weaknesses in ICFR. This finding holds after controlling for factors 
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associated with insider trading and determinants of ineffective ICFR, as well as firms’ prior buy-
and-hold abnormal returns and market reactions to material weakness in ICFR disclosures. 
 To provide further evidence on the link between insider trading profitability and ineffective 
ICFR, we also examine insider trading profitability over time. Prior research suggests that 
information asymmetry declines once firms remediate their ICFR problems and financial 
reporting quality improves (see e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife 2009). If insiders hold less private 
information because financial reporting is more transparent, then we do not expect to find 
significant differences in insider profitability once internal control problems are remediated.  The 
results of our over-time analysis indicate that the incremental profitability of insider trading in 
weak internal control firms is present in the years prior to firms receiving an adverse internal 
control opinion from their auditors, but disappears in the years after remediation of ineffective 
ICFR. These results support our main findings and rule out the potential alternative explanation 
that the greater profitability of insider trading for firms with ineffective ICFR is driven by the 
negative stock price impact of ineffective internal control disclosures. 
 Recent research suggests that the attitude of top management partially explains the variation 
in firms’ reporting practices and strategic outcomes (Bamber et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010). We 
explore whether the attitude of top management is associated with the profitability of insider 
trading by utilizing auditors’ weak “tone at the top” internal control opinions required under 
Section 404 of SOX. Specifically, a material weakness related to “tone at the top” refers to top 
management’s attitude towards creating and maintaining an ethical culture in the workplace. 
“Tone at the top” is viewed as the foundation of effective internal control (Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) 1992) and if there is weak “tone at the top”, it is unlikely that 
even the most comprehensive system of internal control will be effective in constraining self-
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serving management behavior (Kizirian et al. 2005).1 If top managers lack integrity, we expect 
them to be more likely to take advantage of their private information due to weak internal control 
by engaging in more profitable insider trading. 
 Based on auditors’ internal control opinions, we identify 125 firm-years for which the auditor 
identified and publicly disclosed a material weakness in ICFR related to weak “tone at the top”. 
Consistent with our prediction, trading profitability is significantly higher when there is weak 
“tone at the top” relative to other internal control problems. Further tests indicate that the 
profitability of insider sales, rather than purchases, drives the higher insider trading profitability 
results for weak “tone at the top” and other internal control problems.  
 Prior literature documents insider sales transactions are associated with abnormal accruals 
(Bartov and Mohanram 2004; Cheng and Warfield 2005; McVay et al. 2006). To determine 
whether ineffective ICFR and weak “tone at the top” are incrementally more informative about 
insider sales profitability beyond abnormal accruals, we add signed abnormal accruals to our 
insider sales profitability model. The results indicate i) the relation between ineffective ICFR and 
insider sales profitability is distinct from previously documented associations between insider 
sales and positive abnormal accruals, and ii) positive abnormal accruals further contribute to 
insiders’ incremental selling gains when there is weak “tone at the top”. The latter finding 
supports the notion that disclosures of weak “tone at the top” identify a subset of firms where 
manager-specific “styles” contribute to more information asymmetry via low financial reporting 
quality thereby allowing greater rent extraction.   
 In our last analysis, we explore whether insider selling profitability and weak “tone at the 
top” are associated with executive turnover in the C-suite. Consistent with Johnstone et al. 
                                                 
1 Characteristics of weak “tone at the top” include unethical behavior, lack of compliance with policies and 
procedures, incompetency, and irresponsibility (COSO 1992). 
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(2010), we find CEO and CFO turnover is more likely when firms have ineffective ICFR. More 
importantly for our study, we document that the magnitude of CEO and CFO insider selling 
profitability increases the likelihood of them leaving their firms’ employment. Furthermore, we 
document that the profitability of insider selling combined with weak “tone at the top” 
incrementally increases the likelihood of CEO and CFO turnover. 
 Our study makes several contributions. Prior research examining the consequences of 
material weaknesses in ICFR has focused on earnings quality (Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2008; Gong et al. 2009; Altamuro and Beatty 2010), cost of equity (Beneish et al. 
2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009), cost of public and private debt (Costello and Wittenberg-
Moerman 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2011) the market reaction to internal control 
reports (Hammersley et al. 2008), the effect on audit firms (Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Hoitash et 
al. 2008) and CEO/CFO turnover (Johnstone et al. 2010). We advance the ICFR literature in 
three ways. First, we provide evidence on another market consequence of weak ICFR by 
documenting a positive relation between ineffective ICFR and the profitability of insider trading. 
Second, our study highlights that the internal control problem of weak “tone at the top” has a 
positive incremental effect on the profitability of insider trading. Third, we provide evidence that 
the profitability of insider selling by CEOs and CFOs, and this profitability combined with a lack 
of integrity by the CEO/CFO as signaled by weak “tone at the top”, increases the likelihood of 
CEO/CFO turnover.  Overall, we identify and document new market consequences of ineffective 
ICFR. 
 We also contribute to the insider trading literature focused on factors that contribute to 
information asymmetry and insiders’ trading profitability (Aboody and Lev 2000; Frankel and Li 
2004). As Huddart and Ke (2007, p.197) posit, “[i]dentifying the characteristics of firms where 
insiders’ trades are most profitable may prove useful to regulators who design enhanced 
 5
disclosures or other remedies to limit insiders’ trading advantage.” We provide evidence that 
ineffective ICFR is an important factor that relates to insider trading profitability. We also 
provide evidence of increased profitability of insiders’ selling in the presence of top management 
who lack integrity as signaled by weak “top at the top”, thereby contributing to our understanding 
of the settings where shareholders are most at risk for wealth transfers via insider trading. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of related literature 
and our predictions regarding the relation between insider trading profitability and ineffective 
ICFR. In Section 3, we present the sample selection and research design. Section 4 discusses our 
results, Section 5 presents additional tests, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Background and predictions 
2.1. Ineffective internal control and insider trading  
 With the separation of ownership and control, incentives arise for self-interested managers to 
extract rents from shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976), and insider trading is one 
mechanism by which managers can do so (e.g., Baiman and Verrecchia 1996). Much of the prior 
insider trading literature suggests insiders profit at the expense of shareholders when trading their 
firms’ shares. Specifically, insider trades are associated with changes in future stock price (Jaffe 
1974; Finnerty 1976; Seyhun 1986; Seyhun 1998; Lakonishok and Lee 2001) and future earnings 
(Ke et al. 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone 2005). These findings are driven primarily by insiders’ 
share purchases, given that average share sales are more likely driven by managers’ portfolio 
diversification needs (Carpenter and Remmers 2001; Jeng et al. 2003). However, when focusing 
on more specific settings, prior research indicates that share sales are informative for future firm 
performance around seasoned equity offerings (Karpoff and Lee 1991), bankruptcy petition 
filings (Seyhun and Bradley 1997), CEO home purchases (Liu and Yermack 2007), and in 
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situations where trades are allowed to be reported with a delay (Cheng et al. 2007) or are 
formally preannounced (Jagolinzer 2009).  
 While many argue insider trading is harmful (e.g., Ausubel 1990; Fishman and Hagerty 
1992), others argue insider trades are an efficient contracting mechanism (e.g., Roulstone 2003) 
and potentially reveal private information that enhances market efficiency (e.g., Manne 1966; 
Carlton and Fischel 1983). Some studies focus on the benefits associated with the disclosures of 
insider share purchases, such as enhanced credibility of voluntary disclosure (Gu and Li 2007), 
reduced analyst forecast error and dispersion (Lustgarten and Mande 1998), or the resolution of 
information uncertainty (Veenman 2012). However, compared to insider purchases associated 
with subsequent price increases, sales executed before price drops are more harmful and more 
likely trigger litigation due to the losses suffered by shareholders (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006).  
 Theoretical models of informed trading suggest the profitability of insider trading increases 
with the magnitude of information asymmetries existing between insiders, i.e., informed traders, 
and outsiders, i.e., uninformed traders (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; 
Kyle 1985). Theoretical models of disclosure suggest low quality financial reporting results in 
greater information asymmetry between insiders and external users of financial statements (e.g., 
Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Easley and O’Hara 2004). Empirical studies confirm that noise in 
reported financial numbers, such as earnings, affects information asymmetry and information risk 
(Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2011; Bhattacharya et al. 2012).  
 To the extent reliable financial reporting facilitates the flow of credible information from 
insiders to outsiders, agency problems can be mitigated and the likelihood of misappropriation by 
managers declines (Lambert et al. 2007). The risk for managerial rent extraction is accentuated 
when financial reporting is unreliable and managers trade their firms’ shares based on superior 
private information. Effective ICFR provides reasonable assurance that financial statements do 
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not contain any material misstatements thereby enhancing the reliability of firms’ financial 
reporting. When a material weakness in ICFR exists, there is more than a remote likelihood that 
material misstatements in financial reports will not be prevented or detected by a firm’s internal 
control system (Hogan and Wilkins 2008).  
 Material misstatements can be driven by unintentional errors as well as the systematic misuse 
of accounting discretion. Unintentional errors, e.g., inconsistent applications of accounting 
standards or inaccurate collection and processing of financial data, introduce noise in the 
financial statements. As managers have access to superior information about future firm 
performance, noise in contemporaneous financial disclosures contributes to insiders’ asymmetric 
information advantage and hence expected trading profits. Systematic misuse of accounting 
discretion e.g., not booking sufficient warranty reserves or failing to record goodwill 
impairments, creates biased financial statements. Biased financial statements increase 
information asymmetry that can be used advantageously by managers. For example, prior 
research suggests managers sell shares at inflated prices when discretionary accruals are used to 
increase earnings (e.g., Beneish and Vargus 2002; Bartov and Mohanram 2004). 
 Regardless of noise or bias, ineffective ICFR results in less reliable financial information.2 
Thus, we posit ineffective ICFR is an important factor contributing to insiders’ asymmetric 
information advantage and ability to extract rents from shareholders via insider trading. 
2.2. “Tone at the top” and insider trading profitability 
 Prior literature suggests ethical decision making is an influential factor underlying insider 
trading behavior (e.g., Cleek and Leonard 1998; Werhane 1989). However, there is limited 
                                                 
2 While ineffective internal control can lead to an increased likelihood of both noise and bias in financial reports, 
there is limited evidence disentangling the two. The work of Feng et al. (2009) supports the notion that ineffective 
ICFR results in more noise in internal reports that ultimately contributes to less reliable financial statements. Still, the 
likelihood of management override and deliberate misrepresentation is greater in firms with weak internal control 
relative to firms with effective internal control (e.g., Altamuro and Beatty 2010). 
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empirical evidence supporting this claim because prior to SOX 404 reporting, poor ethical 
behavior or lack of integrity by managers, in the absence of fraud, was difficult, if not impossible 
to detect.3  
 Under SOX 404 auditors are required to assess management’s integrity and issue an adverse 
internal control report noting a material weakness in internal control due to weak “tone at the 
top” if the actions and policies of management contribute to an unethical work environment 
(Kizirian et al. 2005). While senior management is ultimately responsible for maintaining 
effective ICFR, the “tone at the top” set by management can be viewed as the foundation of 
effective internal control (COSO 1992). If there is weak “tone at the top”, it is unlikely that other 
policies and procedures under ICFR will curtail inappropriate management behavior (Kizirian et 
al. 2005; Hermanson et al. 2008). 
 Below, we provide excerpts from auditors’ SOX 404 internal control reports for three firms in 
our sample having weak “tone at the top”.  In each disclosure, the auditor makes explicit 
reference to senior management, their actions, and attitudes towards compliance and ethical 
behavior. The third disclosure also specifically refers to the private gains reaped by senior 
management. 
 
“Senior management did not establish and maintain a proper tone as to internal control over 
financial reporting. Specifically, senior management did not emphasize, through consistent 
communication, the importance of internal control over financial reporting and adherence to the 
code of business conduct and ethics.”  
(Bearingpoint Inc., Form 10-K, 1/31/2006) 
 
                                                 
3 Beams et al. (2003) demonstrate in an experimental setting that subjects’ ethical values affected their propensity to 
trade on inside information.  Summers and Sweeney (1998) argue that individuals that are more likely to commit 
fraud are also more likely to pursue illegal insider trading and attribute these behaviors to individual characteristics 
such as low personal ethics, low risk aversion, and overconfidence that illegal actions will go undetected.  We leave 
the exploration of the relation between internal control and fraudulent insider trading to future research. 
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“Former senior management and other personnel failed to establish or adhere to appropriate 
internal controls related to the control environment of the Company. Specifically, former 
management failed to establish and act with appropriate integrity and ethical values…” 
(Offshore Logistics Inc., Form 10-K, 12/16/2005) 
 
 
“[…] the Company did not maintain controls adequate to prevent or detect instances of 
intentional override or intervention of their controls or intentional misconduct by certain former 
members of senior management. […]. This […] permitted certain former members of senior 
management […] to deliberately override certain controls […] resulting in certain transactions 
not being properly accounted for […]. Each of these former members of their senior management 
appears to have also personally benefited from these practices. […] Furthermore, the Company 
did not […] demonstrate a commitment to integrity and objectivity and foster a consistent and 
open flow of information and communication between those initiating transactions and those 
responsible for their financial reporting. Certain former members of senior management 
intentionally exploited this environment […]” 
(Mercury Interactive Inc., Form 10-K/A, 7/03/2006) 
 
 We interpret material weaknesses in ICFR relating to “tone at the top” as a signal of an 
environment in which the potential for rent extraction is at its highest. We expect insiders that 
lack integrity, ignore policies and procedures, or take other actions in their own self-interest, are 
more likely to trade on their information advantage at the expense of outside shareholders and 
earn higher profits. 
 In summary, our study explores whether insiders are able to extract greater rents from 
shareholders when their firms have ineffective ICFR. We argue the rent extraction occurs 
because insiders hold more private information in the presence of weak ICFR. In our initial 
analysis, we hold constant the type or “style” of managers in firms with ineffective versus 
effective ICFR. That is, the effect of weak ICFR on insider trading profitability is predicted to 
exist regardless of managers’ styles. In contrast, our second analysis where we focus on “tone at 
the top” allows us to directly examine the association between managers’ styles and the 
profitability of insider trading. Specifically, we investigate whether top managers identified as 
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lacking integrity by the external auditor exploit their private information advantage by engaging 
in more profitable insider trading. 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample and data 
 The sample used in our empirical tests is reported in Panel A of Table 1 and is constructed as 
follows. We begin by collecting all firm-year observations with an audit opinion on ICFR 
effectiveness under Section 404 of SOX (n=20,518) from Audit Analytics for the period 2004-
2008, representing 5,951 unique firms. Audit Analytics covers all SEC registrants filing on 
EDGAR, which allows us to examine the most comprehensive sample of Section 404 audit 
opinions possible. The sample begins in 2004 as accelerated filers were required to comply with 
Section 404 for fiscal years ending on November 15, 2004 and beyond, and runs through fiscal 
years ending in December 2008. We eliminate 1,887 (642) firm-year observations (firms) that 
could not be matched with the CRSP/Compustat merged database. Next, we drop 907 firm-year 
observations missing data from Compustat’s Fundamentals Annual Table necessary to construct 
the control variables used in our empirical analyses. Finally, we eliminate 2,057 observations 
missing stock return data on CRSP which are necessary for calculating buy-and-hold stock 
returns, resulting in a sample of 15,667 firm-year observations comprised of 4,505 unique firms.  
 Of the 15,667 firm-year observations, 1,455 (9.3%) relate to firms having at least one 
material weakness in their ICFR.  For our main analysis, we create an indicator variable (MWIC) 
equal to one for material weakness firm-years, zero otherwise. 4 
                                                 
4Specific details related to the detection and reporting on material weaknesses in ICFR are as follows.  Section 302 
establishes that CEOs and CFOs are responsible for the effectiveness of a firm’s system of internal control and 
reliability of external financial reporting. These officers are required to provide certifications that each quarterly and 
annual report does not contain untrue or omitted material facts, that the financial statements fairly present the 
company’s financial condition, and that they have evaluated the effectiveness of the company’s system of internal 
controls. Section 302, effective August 29, 2002, applies to all firms. Section 404 requires management to evaluate 
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- Insert Table 1 about here – 
 Next, we identify the firm-year observations that have insider transactions as indicated by 
Form 4 filings with the SEC.5 Our study focuses on the insider trading transactions of the C-suite 
(CEOs/CFOs) and other officers (e.g. Chief Operating Officer, Chief Investment Officer, etc.) as 
these insiders are responsible for maintaining effective ICFR and for making the estimates and 
accounting choices that impact their firms’ financial statements.6 We obtain insider trades from 
Thomson Reuters’ Insiders Data Feed and collect open market purchases and sales by officers.7 
Next, we eliminate observations with missing CUSIP identifier or other missing fields such as 
transaction price or number of shares traded. Lastly, we retain only those transactions that can be 
matched with CRSP. 
 Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics on insider trading activities reported on Form 4. 
Consistent with prior literature, insider share sales occur more often and are more material than 
insider purchases (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Brochet 2010). Insider purchases are identified 
in 4,552 firm-years with a median dollar amount traded of $94,819 (0.016% of opening market 
value), while insider sales are identified in 10,603 firm-years with a median dollar amount traded 
equal to $2,701,191 (0.216% of opening market value).  
                                                                                                                                                              
and report on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) in the annual 10-K filing. The 
independent auditor is required to express a separate opinion and attest to management’s evaluation. Section 404 is 
effective for all “accelerated filers” with fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004.  The requirement for 
non-accelerated filers to comply with Section 404 has been postponed multiple times, and now has been eliminated 
with the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4173  
5 Insider trading in the U.S. is regulated under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and the Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002. Insiders’, i.e., officers, directors, and large shareholders of more than ten percent of any 
equity class of securities of an issuing company (Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act), trades are required to be publicly 
disclosed via the filing of Form 4 to the SEC. 
6 In contrast, non-officer directors have less extensive access to private information of the firms that they govern.  
We examine the trading profitability of non-officer directors in a sensitivity test. 
7 Consistent with the literature (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006; Gu and Li 2007; Rogers 2008), we focus only on open 
market transactions and exclude transactions relating to stock options from our analysis. We exclude stock option 
grants because the awards are not solely at the discretion of the manager, and purchases through option exercises to 
avoid double counting because option exercises are often associated with immediate share sales (Ofek and Yermack 
2000). 
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 Panel C of Table 1 provides some insights into the over-time variation in insider trading 
activity and material weakness in ICFR disclosures. While insider trading activity is relatively 
constant over the sample period 2004-2008, we observe a monotonic decline in the percentage of 
accelerated filers disclosing a material weakness in ICFR. The peak in material weakness 
disclosures in 2004 of 17.3% gradually declines to 3.2% in 2008. This pattern is consistent with 
recent studies (Cheffers et al. 2010; Kinney and Shepardson 2011). 
3.2. Measuring insider trading profitability 
 We define the profitability of insider trades as the (unrealized) capital gains after purchases 
and the losses avoided by selling shares. If insiders’ trades only reflect information already 
impounded in stock prices, average insider trading profitability should be zero. Aggregate trading 
profitability is determined by i) the difference between the market price of the stock and its value 
based on private information, ii) the amount traded, and iii) the frequency of trading (Huddart and 
Ke 2007; Huddart et al. 2007). Focusing only on the returns after insider trades as a proxy for 
profitability ignores the materiality of individual trades, whereas focusing on trading intensity 
ignores the predictive ability of insider trades with respect to future stock price performance. 
Therefore, following the work of Huddart and Ke (2007), we consider all three factors in 
developing one aggregate measure of insider trading profitability at the firm-year level. 
 Specifically, we construct our empirical measure of insider trading profitability as follows. 
First, when multiple trades by different insiders of the same firm occur on the same day, these 
trades are aggregated at the firm-day level and duplicate firm-days are eliminated. Next, the 
difference between the market price and value based on private information is determined by the 
predictive ability of the trades. That is, we compute the one-year buy-and-hold abnormal (size-
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adjusted) return after each individual trade using daily stock returns from CRSP.8 The gain 
realized from purchases is then calculated by multiplying the abnormal return by the dollar value 
traded. For sales, we take the negative of the product of abnormal return and value traded, as the 
gain for the insider is determined by the loss avoided when selling shares. Lastly, we aggregate 
individual transactions at the firm-year level:  
1
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where ABRETit is equal to the one-year buy-and-hold abnormal return computed for the period 
starting one day after transaction date j, VALUE_BOUGHTitj (VALUE_SOLDitj) equals the total 
dollar value of shares bought (sold) by all insiders on day j, n is the total number of firm-days 
with insider trading activity during firm-year it, and MVit-1 equals the market value of equity at 
the end of fiscal year t-1. The outcome of equation (1) is multiplied by 100 to denote PROFIT% 
as a percentage of market value at the beginning of the year.9  
 Lastly, as pointed out by Frankel and Li (2004), insiders will not trade on their private 
information when doing so would be unprofitable. Recognizing that insiders’ private information 
                                                 
8 Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 prevents short-term trading opportunities to insiders by 
allowing shareholders to recover the profits made by an insider from purchasing and selling (or selling and 
purchasing) within a period of six months. As a result, the insider trading literature generally finds that insider trades 
are associated with abnormal stock returns over periods of one year (Lakonishok and Lee 2001) or even longer (Ke 
et al. 2003) after the trade. Our main conclusions regarding the association between ineffective internal control and 
insider trading profitability are qualitatively unaffected by the use of alternative return measurement windows of 6, 
12, 18, or 24 months. 
9 We scale our measure of insider trading profitability by market value of equity because we find the magnitude of 
insiders’ trades is significantly correlated with firm size. Scaling by firm size helps alleviate concerns that our results 
are driven by a small subset of large firms. We obtain qualitatively similar results when using beginning-of-the-year 
total assets as a deflator or when we use the unscaled dollar magnitude of insider trading profitability. For a subset of 
observations with available data, we also reran our analyses when deflating profitability by the value of insiders’ 
share holdings (shares held plus options exercisable during year t) at the beginning of the year. Our inferences 
remain the same. 
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affects the opportunity to trade profitability, we include firm-years for which there are no 
reported insider trades and set PROFIT% equal to zero (Huddart and Ke 2007).10 
3.3. Control variables 
 In our multivariate analyses, we control for factors associated with insider trading 
profitability, material weakness disclosures and market reactions to MWIC-related disclosures.11 
First, we control for firm size using the market value of equity at the beginning of the year over 
which trading is measured (MV). Seyhun (1986) finds that insiders buy more in smaller firms and 
sell more in larger firms, while Lakonishok and Lee (2001) report that insiders trade more 
profitably in smaller firms. Next, we control for the book-to-market ratio (BTM) at the beginning 
of the year because prior research suggests insiders trade as contrarians (Rozeff and Zaman 1998; 
Piotroski and Roulstone 2005).  We also control for the buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the 
one-year period ending one day before the first insider transaction (BHARPRE) to diminish the 
concern that finding a positive relation between insider trading profitability and MWIC is due to 
returns momentum. 
 We control for analyst following (NUMEST) since Frankel and Li (2004) show that insider 
profitability is inversely related to analyst following. In addition, Frankel and Li (2004) find 
some evidence of a negative association between financial statement informativeness and the 
extent to which insider trades are predictive of future stock returns. Financial statement 
informativeness (FSINFORM) is measured by the adjusted R2 from a firm-specific time-series 
                                                 
10 Of the 15,667 firm-years in the sample, the vast majority of firm-years (13,572 or 87%) have reported trading 
activity over the fiscal year. Over the period 2004-2008, insiders trade in 4,092 of the 4,505 firms included in the 
sample.  See footnotes 16 and 20 for more details related to analyses where the sample is comprised of only firms 
reporting trading activity (i.e., “active firms”). 
11 All variables introduced in this section are defined more explicitly in Appendix A. 
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regression of price per share on book value and earnings per share.12 In addition, variables 
capturing institutional ownership (INST) and firm age (AGE) are added to further control for 
variation in information asymmetry. Following Frankel and Li (2004), we control for return 
volatility (RETVOL). As Huddart and Ke (2007) demonstrate that their measure of information 
asymmetry based on absolute market reactions to earnings announcements is most strongly 
related to insider trading profitability, we also control for this measure (MAG_AR). 
 Turning to the determinants of internal control problems, we control for a firm’s financial 
performance by including a variable capturing recent losses (%LOSS) defined as the percentage 
of the most recent three years in which the firm reports a loss. The ratio of inventory to assets is 
used to control for accounting application measurement risk (INV). BIG4 is an indicator variable 
for firms hiring a dominant audit firm. SEGMENTS and FSALES capture the number of reported 
business segments and whether a firm has foreign sales activities, respectively, and proxy for 
business complexity. M&A and RESTRUCT are indicator variables for merger and acquisition 
and restructuring activities, respectively. Lastly, AUDITOR captures auditor change during the 
year. 
 We also control for the stock price effect of material weakness disclosures.13 Prior research 
suggests disclosures of internal control weaknesses are perceived negatively by capital market 
participants, resulting in a negative shock to the firm’s stock price (e.g., Beneish et al. 2008; 
Hammersley et al. 2008). Given that in our sample, on average, insiders sell more shares than 
they buy (see Panel B of Table 1), sorting firms on a characteristic associated with negative 
                                                 
12 We construct our measure of financial statement informativeness (FSINFORM) using quarterly data over a 20-
quarter period ending with the fourth quarter of fiscal year t, requiring a minimum of 8 quarterly observations. 
Frankel and Li (2004) use annual data requiring at least five years. Because using annual data requires a longer time 
series of firm data, this significantly reduces our sample size and introduces a potential survivorship bias into our 
data. We therefore choose to use quarterly data, however note that our results are robust to using annual data 
requiring a minimum of five years to construct FSINFORM.  
13 We thank the reviewer for alerting us to this important set of controls. 
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future stock returns can induce a mechanical relation between the characteristic (here: internal 
control ineffectiveness) and insider trading profitability.14 To rule out this potential alternative 
explanation, we also control for the disclosure effect by including variables capturing the market 
reaction to weak ICFR disclosures in our analyses. 
 As the opinion on internal control effectiveness under Section 404 is annually disclosed in the 
10-K, we create a variable capturing the market reaction to the 10-K filing, BHAR_10K, 
computed as the five day buy-and-hold abnormal (size-adjusted) return centered on the filing 
date. However, investors may infer internal control problems earlier than the 10-K filing through 
other disclosures. Impink et al. (2012) show that about half of all accelerated filers with a 
material weakness in ICFR are “late filers” and notify the SEC of late filing on Form 12b-25 
prior to the 10-K filing. Given i) firms often disclose internal control problems in these late filing 
notifications, and ii) the inability to file on time itself signals weak internal control, we 
additionally create a variable BHAR_NT equal to the market reaction to late filing notifications 
obtained through Audit Analytics’ Non-timely Filer Information and Analysis database.15 
 As internal control problems are associated with restatements (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; 
Leone 2007), investors may also learn about the effectiveness of ICFR prior to the 10-K filing 
through a restatement announcement. Therefore, we collect restatements from non-reliance 
disclosures in 8-K filings through Audit Analytics’ Non-Reliance Restatements database for the 
period between fiscal year end and the 10-K filing. We find 26.0% of our material weakness 
firms announce a restatement during this period. BHAR_RESTATE equals the market reaction 
around these restatement announcements. Lastly, for our material weakness firms we collect all 
                                                 
14 In addition, insiders could be trading on the forthcoming disclosure of internal control weaknesses. Although this 
scenario is consistent with opportunistic insider trading, it is inconsistent with our prediction that ineffective internal 
control affects insider trading profitability through noise and bias in financial reporting. 
15 Consistent with Impink et al. (2012), we find 47.4% of our material weakness firms file a notification of late filing 
with the SEC. Of firms with effective ICFR, only 3.8% are late filers. 
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8-K filings from EDGAR that occurred during the window starting at fiscal year-end through the 
10-K filing date. We search these filings for the keywords “material weakness” and identify 
30.4% of our material weakness firm-year observations have such an 8-K filing. When multiple 
8-K filings are identified, we retain only the earliest and create the variable BHAR_8K equal to 
the market reaction around 8-K filings containing the phrase “material weakness”. 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
 Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on insider trading profitability. Mean 
PROFIT% for material weakness firms (0.0462%) is significantly greater than for firms with 
effective ICFR (0.0044%). Additional distributional characteristics suggest that the differences in 
means are not driven by a handful of opportunistic insiders.  The Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
indicates the distribution of trading profitability for ineffective firms is significantly different 
from that for effective firms even though the median trading profitability is zero for both 
ineffective and effective ICFR firms. Also, we find firms with ineffective internal control are 
significantly more likely to end up in the top deciles of yearly trading profitability.  Moreover, 
the relative number of firms with positive trading profitability is significantly greater for firms 
with ineffective internal control. 
 In order to provide additional evidence on the economic significance of insiders’ trading 
profits, we also present statistics on the unscaled profitability measure. On average, trading 
profitability of $273,390 for ineffective ICFR firms is significantly greater than the trading 
profitability of $51,263 for effective ICFR firms.16 Overall, statistics in Panel A provide initial 
                                                 
16 Recall that we include in our measure of PROFIT% firm-year observations for which there are no reported insider 
trades (Huddart and Ke 2007). If we eliminate these observations from the descriptive statistics and calculate trading 
profitability using only “active” firms, we see stronger differences in the profitability of insider trading across 
ineffective and effective internal control samples. Specifically, “active” ineffective internal control firms gain, on 
average, $445,661 (0.0914% of market value) versus the profitability of insider trading by “active” firms with no 
internal control problems is only $64,377 (0.0057% of market value). Median trading profitability is also 
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evidence on our prediction that managers have greater ability to extract rents via insider trading 
in firms with ineffective internal control. 17 
- Insert Table 2 about here - 
 Panel B of Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the control variables. Firms with 
ineffective internal control are smaller (ln(MV)), younger (AGE), and have more volatile stock 
returns (RETVOL). In addition, material weakness firms have higher book-to-market ratios 
(BTM), lower analyst following (NUMEST), and lower institutional ownership (INST). The 
descriptive statistics also indicate that firms having ineffective internal control are more likely to 
report research and development expenses (RND). Consistent with the notion that ineffective 
ICFR results in greater information asymmetry, we find earnings and book value to be less price- 
informative (FSINFORM) and stronger market reactions around earnings announcements 
(MAG_AR) for firms with ineffective internal control. The differences in firm characteristics 
between ineffective and effective ICFR firms are consistent with prior research examining firms 
with internal control problems (e.g., see Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). 
 Panel C of Table 2 presents average market reactions to MWIC-related events. The average 
market reaction to 10-K filings containing the official material weakness disclosure is negative 
and marginally significant (-0.35%; p-value: 0.070). The market reaction to late filing 
notifications by material weakness firms is significantly negative (-1.98%; p-value<0.01). 
Similarly, market reactions to restatement announcements by material weakness firms are 
                                                                                                                                                              
significantly greater in firms with ineffective internal control ($35,880; 0.0070%) versus firms with effective internal 
control ($23,024; 0.0028%). 
17 To gain further insights into insider trading behavior in the presence of ineffective ICFR, we test whether the 
frequency and magnitude of trading differs between firms with weak versus effective internal control. Results 
indicate trading frequency (as measured by the filing of Form 4) and magnitude (as measured by the dollar value of 
trades) is not different between the two types of firms.  Therefore, it appears that our measure of insider trading 
profitability, developed by Huddart and Ke (2007), better captures the rent-extraction associated with insider trading 
by including an estimate of profits as a function of future changes in share price. 
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negative and significant (-2.30%; p-value<0.01), while average market reactions to 8-K filings 
containing the phrase “material weakness” are slightly less negative (-1.04%; p-value: 0.049). We 
control for these market reactions to diminish the concern that declines in share prices of 
ineffective ICFR firms drive a positive relation between ICFR ineffectiveness and insider trading 
profitability. 
 In Table 3, we present correlations among insider trading profitability (PROFIT%), internal 
control effectiveness (MWIC), and control variables related to insider trading profitability. 
Pearson product-moment correlations are presented in the upper-right, and Spearman rank order 
correlations in the lower-left portion of the table. As predicted, the correlation between 
PROFIT% and MWIC is positive and significant. The vast majority of insider profitability control 
variables are significantly correlated with PROFIT%. Variance inflation factors (untabulated) 
suggest our multivariate analyses are not subject to multicollinearity concerns. 
- Insert Table 3 about here - 
4. Empirical findings  
4.1. Insider trading profitability and ineffective ICFR 
 To examine the association between ICFR effectiveness and insider trading profitability, we 
estimate the following OLS regression (firm and time subscripts omitted for brevity): 
PROFIT%  = 0 + 1MWIC + Insider trading determinants + MWIC determinants  
+ Market reaction variables +       	
 
All insider trading determinants, MWIC determinants, and market reaction variables are as 
previously defined and detailed in Appendix A. Continuous variables are winsorized to the 1st 
and 99th percentiles of their distributions and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustering at the firm-level (Petersen 2009). In addition, we include year- and industry-fixed 
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effects.  We expect 1 to be positive and significant as it indicates the difference in insider trading 
profitability between firms with ineffective versus effective ICFR. 
 Table 4 reports regression results. Each specification of our regression model is significant 
and the adjusted R2 is comparable to prior research (Huddart and Ke 2007). The base model 
presents the results of estimating equation (2) including only the set of insider trading controls. 
Coefficient estimates for the insider trading controls suggest insider trading profitability is less 
for value firms (BTM) and declines with financial statement informativeness (FSINFORM). 
Profits are greater for firms with better prior performance (BHARPRE) and greater return 
volatility (RETVOL). After controlling for these factors, we find a significantly positive 
coefficient on MWIC. 
 Our second estimation of equation (2) includes controls for the determinants of material 
weaknesses in ICFR. We find the signs and significance levels of the coefficient estimates for the 
insider trading controls to be similar to the base model.  Moreover, we continue to document a 
significantly positive coefficient on MWIC. In the last columns of Table 4, we report the results 
of the model controlling for the market reactions to MWIC-related events.  We find these 
information events contribute to insiders’ trading profitability. Trading gains increase as the 
market reacts more negatively to 10-K filings, late filing notifications, and restatement 
announcements. However, the coefficient on MWIC remains positive and significant allowing us 
to conclude that insiders trade more profitably, and hence extract greater rents, in firms with 
ineffective internal control.  
- Insert Table 4 about here - 
4.2. Insider trading profitability over time  
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 Our main findings are consistent with the conjecture that ineffective ICFR contributes to the 
profitability of insider trading because internal control problems create greater information 
asymmetry between managers and outsiders due to noise and/or bias in the financial statements. 
Under the assumption that internal control problems exist in years prior to the assessment and 
disclosure of weak ICFR under SOX Section 404 (e.g., Doyle et al. 2007a), our main result of 
increased trading profits in the presence of weak ICFR should also hold for prior years. 
Furthermore, if ineffective internal control allows insiders to enhance their private information, 
then the increased trading profits associated with ineffective ICFR should disappear once firms 
remediate their ICFR problems and financial reporting quality improves, which reduces 
information asymmetry between insiders and shareholders.  Specifically, we expect no significant 
difference in insider trading profitability between firms that have always had effective ICFR and 
firms that remediate their internal control problems. To test these conjectures, we add fiscal years 
2002-2003 to our sample of accelerated filers reporting under SOX Section 404 during the 2004-
2008 period and introduce indicator variables that capture the pre-disclosure and post-
remediation periods. 
 Extending the sample back to fiscal years ending in or after December 2002, we obtain a 
sample of 23,535 firm-year observations with data necessary to estimate equation (2), where 
MWIC is replaced by PRE and POST. PRE is set equal to one for firm-years before the year of 
the adverse internal control opinion and zero otherwise. If ineffective ICFR due to improper 
accounting standard application, lack of policies or procedures, or any other weakness facilitates 
insiders’ trading profitability by increasing information asymmetry, we expect a positive and 
significant relation between PRE and PROFIT%. The indicator variable POST is set equal to one 
for firm-years after the disclosure of the remediation of previous material weaknesses occurs, 
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zero otherwise.18 We predict the coefficient on POST to be insignificant, indicating no 
differential insider trading profitability compared with firms receiving clean opinions. 
- Insert Table 5 about here - 
 Table 5 displays results on the temporal variation in insider trading profitability. Focusing on 
the PRE variable, the significantly positive coefficients indicate the trading profitability of the C-
suite and other officers to be present in the years leading up to the fiscal year of the adverse SOX 
404 opinion.  In contrast, the coefficients on POST are not statistically different from zero. That 
is, insiders’ incremental private information advantage manifesting in insider trading profitability 
disappears once material ICFR problems are resolved. 
 Given that the abnormal returns on insider trades in the PRE period do not overlap with the 
disclosure of internal control problems, our over time tests further alleviate the concern that 
profits on insider trading are driven by the disclosure of ICFR, rather than incremental private 
information due to poor internal control. Collectively, the above analysis strengthens our main 
findings and conclusions regarding the association between ineffective ICFR and the ability of 
insiders to extract private rents at the expense of shareholders. 
4.3. Weak “tone at the top”  
 To assess the association between top management integrity and insider trading profitability, 
we estimate the following regression:  
PROFIT%  = 0 + 1MWIC + 2TONE + Insider trading determinants + MWIC determinants  
+ Market reaction variables +     	 
TONE is coded one if a firm has a material weakness that is related to “tone at the top” and zero 
otherwise. Weak “tone at the top” control problems are based on the reason key fields provided 
                                                 
18 For example, POST is equal to one for fiscal years 2006-2008 if the firm discloses a material weakness for fiscal-
year 2004 and a clean opinion for fiscal-year 2005. 
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by Audit Analytics describing the nature of the material weakness(es) contributing to ineffective 
control. Specifically, TONE equals one when Audit Analytics classifies a material weakness as 
“Senior management competency, tone, reliability issues” (reason key #13) or “Ethical or 
compliance issues with personnel” (reason key #21), zero otherwise. Based on this classification, 
we identify 125 firm-year observations as having weak “tone at the top” (0.8%).19 TONE captures 
the incremental aggregate trading profitability for firms that have been identified by their auditors 
as having top managers who lack integrity, relative to firms with other types of internal control 
problems. 
 Panel A of Table 6 presents summary statistics on insider trading profitability in firms with 
weak “tone at the top” versus firms with other types of material weaknesses. We find initial 
evidence supporting our prediction that top managers identified by auditors as lacking integrity 
engage in more profitable insider trading relative to managers of firms with other internal control 
problems. The descriptive statistics indicate that the average trading profitability of 0.1053% for 
weak “tone at the top” insiders is significantly greater than the 0.0406% for insiders in firms with 
other internal control weaknesses. Average unscaled insider trading profitability of $1,008,288 
for weak “tone at the top” is significantly greater than the $204,321 for other ineffective ICFR.20 
 Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of our weak “tone at the top” tests. Coefficients on all 
control variables are not reported for brevity. Consistent with our prediction, we find a positive 
and significant coefficient on TONE. This suggests managers lacking ethics or integrity gain even 
more from trading their firms’ shares than managers in firms with other types of internal control 
                                                 
19 44 firm-year observations are identified as having problems with “senior management competency, tone, reliability 
issues”, 34 firm-year observations are identified as having problems with “Ethical or compliance issues with 
personnel”, and 47 firm-year observations are identified as having both types of problems. 
20 Similar to our primary analysis, if we limit the sample to active firms we find even stronger evidence of 
differences between TONE and MWIC firms. Specifically, insider trading profitability of TONE firms 
(mean=$2,060,343 (0.3022%); median=$277,930 (0.0227%)) is significantly greater than the insider trading 
profitability of firms with other types of internal control problems (mean=$308,694 (0.0735%); median=$30,821 
(0.0065%)). 
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problems. Moreover, after adding TONE to the model, the positive coefficient on MWIC is still 
significant (p-value: 0.014). These results indicate that insiders of firms with internal control 
problems trade more profitably, and trading profitability is even greater when managers are 
tagged as lacking integrity or ethical behavior. 21 
- Insert Table 6 about here - 
 To explore whether the type of trade by insiders affects the rents extracted from ineffective 
ICFR and, more specifically, weak “tone at the top”, we disaggregate insider trading profitability 
by purchases versus sales. Prior literature finds the average predictive ability of insider trading 
for future returns to be greater for purchases than sales, which is attributed to differing insider 
incentives and risks (e.g., Jeng et al. 2003). On the other hand, shareholders are more likely hurt 
when insiders sell shares based on bad news private information rather than when they buy shares 
based on good news private information (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006). 
 We re-estimate equation (3) using the profitability of purchase transactions 
(PURCHASEPROFIT%) and the profitability of sales transactions (SALESPROFIT%) as the 
dependent variable, and report the results in the second and third columns in Panel B of Table 6, 
respectively. When we estimate the model using PURCHASEPROFIT% as the dependent 
variable, the coefficients on MWIC and TONE are insignificant. Hence, we find no evidence 
suggesting that insider purchases are more profitable in firms with ineffective ICFR nor more 
profitable when managers lack effective “tone at the top” compared to firms with no material 
weaknesses in internal control. 
                                                 
21 Our distributional statistics in Tables 2 and 6 indicate that insider trading profitability is positively skewed raising 
the concern that extreme observations potentially drive our results.  To alleviate this concern, we conduct a 
robustness check using rank values of PROFIT%. When replacing PROFIT% with DPROFIT (defined as the annual 
decile rank of PROFIT%) and running an ordered probit regression, the coefficient on MWIC remains positive and 
significant (p-value=0.044). The coefficient on TONE confirms a significant incremental positive association 
between insider trading profitability and managers lacking effective “tone at the top” (p-value=0.045). 
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 Turning to the profitability of insiders’ sales, we find significantly positive coefficients on 
MWIC and TONE indicating that insiders of firms with material weaknesses in ICFR and weak 
“tone at the top”, respectively, extract incrementally greater rents selling ahead of price declines 
than firms with effective ICFR. 22  Interestingly, when we re-estimate our primary model 
(equation 2) substituting PURCHASEPROFIT% for PROFIT% (not tabled), we find a 
significantly negative coefficient on MWIC (p-value <0.05) suggesting that insiders of firms with 
ineffective ICFR are not acquiring their firms’ shares at favorable prices relative to insiders of 
firms with effective internal control.  In contrast, we find a significantly positive coefficient on 
MWIC (p-value < 0.01) when using SALESPROFIT% as the dependent variable (not tabled), 
indicating that insiders’ of firms with material weaknesses in ICFR are selling their shares prior 
to share price declines. Overall, these findings suggest our main results documenting a positive 
association between insider trading profitability and ineffective ICFR are driven by insider 
selling.23  
4.4. Propensity score matched samples 
 Our tests thus far are based on pooled cross-sectional regressions. In this sub-section, we test 
the robustness of our findings to using propensity score matched samples (results not tabulated). 
Specifically, instead of comparing “treatment” firms (MWIC=1 or TONE=1) to all other firms in 
the sample, we match each treatment firm to a control firm that is dissimilar with regard to the 
treatment effect (MWIC=0 or TONE=0) but similar along other observable dimensions. The 
advantage of this approach is that it does not specify a (linear) functional form for confounding 
                                                 
22 Our results are qualitatively similar when we exclude sales of shares acquired through stock option exercises. 
23 To provide corroborating evidence supporting this inference, we repeat the over-time analysis substituting 
PURCHASEPROFIT% (SALESPROFIT%) for PROFIT% (not tabled). The coefficients on PRE and POST when 
using PURCHASEPROFIT% as the dependent variable are insignificant.  However, we continue to find a positive 
and significant coefficient on PRE and an insignificant coefficient on POST when using SALESPROFIT% as the 
dependent variable. 
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effects and thereby potentially better controls for determinants of ineffective ICFR (e.g., 
Armstrong et al. 2010). 
 We first estimate a logit regression with MWIC as the dependent variable and including 
internal control determinants, insider trading controls, and year fixed effects. Based on the 
regression estimates for the sample of 15,667 firm-year observations, we compute the conditional 
probability of having ineffective ICFR given the set of observable firm characteristics 
(“propensity score”). We similarly compute the conditional probability of having weak “tone at 
the top” given the set of firm characteristics using logit regression with TONE as the dependent 
variable for the sample of 1,455 ineffective ICFR observations. We then match each firm 
identified as having ineffective ICFR (weak “tone at the top”) with a control firm having 
effective ICFR (ineffective ICFR but no problems with “tone at the top”) and the closest 
propensity score.24 
 Our results are robust to using propensity score matched samples. Average insider trading 
profitability in 1,455 firms with ineffective ICFR (mean PROFIT%=0.0723) remains 
significantly greater compared to 1,455 effective ICFR firms (mean PROFIT%=-0.0001) with 
similar observable characteristics (p-value<0.001). Similarly, we find that average insider trading 
profitability in the 125 firms with weak “tone at the top” is significantly higher compared to 125 
matched firms with other types of ineffective ICFR and similar characteristics (0.2176 versus 
0.0662; p-value=0.031). The significance of these differences increases when focusing only on 
insider sales. Based on these results, we conclude that our main findings are robust to using a 
matched-pair rather than a pooled sample research design. 
                                                 
24 An evaluation of the covariate balances after these matching procedures suggests both procedures identified firms 
with similar characteristics on observable dimensions (i.e., we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mean 
(median) of a variable is similar between the two groups of firms for all variables and both matching procedures 
using a t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)). Because this suggests that the matched control firms are similar to treatment 
firms along observable dimensions, differences between treatment and control firms can be attributed to the 
treatment effect. 
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5. Additional tests 
5.1. The effect of abnormal accruals 
 Prior research provides evidence that accruals management by firms is associated with 
subsequent opportunistic insider trading (e.g., Beneish and Vargus 2002; Bartov and Mohanram 
2004).  To show that our results are not merely driven by previously documented effects of 
accruals on insiders’ trading, we replicate our earlier analysis for insider sales and control for the 
level of positive and negative abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are measured using the 
performance-adjustment method introduced by Kothari et al. (2005) and we split abnormal 
accruals into signed variables reflecting their positive and negative values. POS_AACADJ equals 
performance-adjusted abnormal accruals when positive (zero otherwise), while NEG_AACADJ 
equals performance-adjusted abnormal accruals when negative (zero otherwise). The sample size 
is 11,956 firm-year observations after eliminating firms missing data necessary to calculate 
abnormal accruals and financial services firms (2-digit SIC codes 60-69) to be consistent with 
prior literature (see. e.g., Francis et al. 2005)  
 Panel A of Table 7 reports results controlling for abnormal accruals. In the first column, we 
report the main effect and in the last column we include interaction terms. We continue to find 
significantly positive coefficients on MWIC and TONE after controlling for abnormal accruals. 
Moreover, we find a marginally significant positive association between trading profitability and 
the positive values of abnormal accruals. The coefficient on negative abnormal accruals is 
insignificant.  These findings are consistent with managers profiting from selling shares in 
periods of inflated earnings. 
- Insert Table 7 about here - 
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 Next, we analyze interactions between internal control effectiveness and positive abnormal 
accruals. If managers use their discretion to manage earnings in the presence of ineffective 
internal control and benefit from selling shares at inflated prices, we expect a stronger association 
between positive accruals and trading profitability for TONE firms. The coefficient on MWIC 
remains positive and significant and, as expected, we find a positive coefficient on the interaction 
of TONE and positive abnormal accruals. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that 
upwards earnings management by managers that lack integrity contributes to insider’s 
incremental trading profitability.  
 To summarize, we document i) the internal control effect on insider trading profitability is 
distinctly different from previously documented associations between insider sales and income-
increasing earnings management, and ii) income-increasing abnormal accruals contribute to 
insiders incremental selling profits when there is weak “tone at the top”. This last finding 
suggests managers lacking integrity increase their private information via the booking of 
extensive positive accruals and are able to engage in more profitable selling as a result. This 
finding adds to a growing body of literature examining the consequences of manager-specific 
styles (e.g., Ge et al. 2011).25 
5.2. Insider type analysis 
 Recall our primary analyses are focused on the insider trading of officers as they often have 
greater access to accounting records and knowledge of financial disclosure details.  To provide 
                                                 
25 Specifically, Ge et al. (2011) identify a sample of CFOs that work in the same position for at least two different 
firms across different periods to determine manager-specific fixed effects. When adding these manager-specific fixed 
effects to regressions of accounting quality attributes on i) firm fixed effects and ii) time-varying firm characteristics, 
they find that manager-specific factors explain a modest portion of variation in the attributes. Similar research 
designs are used in recent studies to examine manager-specific effects on variables such as earnings guidance 
(Bamber et al. 2010) or tax avoidance (Dyreng et al. 2010).  Our study differs from these studies in that we use an 
independent assessment of manager characteristics, that being the auditor identified weakness in “tone at the top”, to 
examine the relation between manager-specific styles and insider trading profitability. 
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insights into whether non-officers engage in more profitable insider trading in the presence of 
ineffective ICFR, we examine the profitability of share sales by insider type.  Specifically we 
partition the sample by C-suite (CEOs/CFOs), other officers (e.g. Chief Operating Officer, Chief 
Investment Officer, etc.), and non-officer directors and re-estimate equation (3) using 
SALESPROFIT% as the dependent variable.  Panel B of Table 7 reports the results. We continue 
to find a positive association between ineffective ICFR and insider trading profitability for both 
CEOs/CFOs and other officers. Moreover, we find these insiders’ trading profits to be higher 
when there are problems with “tone at the top”. In contrast, when we estimate equation (2) using 
non-officer director sales profitability the coefficients on MWIC and TONE are insignificant.  A 
potential explanation for not finding a significant association between the profitability of non-
officer directors’ sales and MWIC (TONE) is that these insiders’ ownership interests are relatively 
small thereby limiting the number of shares that can be sold. Overall, however, the evidence 
presented in Panel B of Table 7 suggests firms’ internal control problems, in general, and weak 
“tone at the top”, specifically, are related to C-suite personnel and other officers’ insider selling 
profitability. 
5.3. Tone at the top, insider trading profitability, and C-suite turnover 
 Our findings thus far demonstrate that ineffective ICFR is positively related to the 
profitability of CEO/CFO insider sales and that weak “tone at the top” adds to explaining the 
profitability of CEO and CFO insider selling.  If the board ultimately realizes i) that the CEO and 
CFO are selling their holdings when they have informational advantages over other shareholders 
due to weak ICFR, and ii) the CEO and CFO have been identified as lacking integrity by the 
 30
firm’s auditor, the board may consider terminating these key executives as a way to remediate 
weak “tone at the top”.26   
 To investigate this conjecture, we collect CEO/CFO turnover data for our sample firms from 
Audit Analytics Director and Officer Changes database and assess whether the profitability of 
insider selling is related to CEO and/or CFO turnover conditional on weak “tone at the top” by 
estimating the following logit regression: 
TURNOVER =0 + 1DPROFIT + 2TONE + 3TONE*DPROFIT  
  + Control variables +    	 
where TURNOVER is coded one when the effective date of turnover for the CEO (CFO) is within 
one year of the fiscal year end t, and zero otherwise27 and DPROFIT is defined as the decile-rank 
of SALESPROFIT% for the CEO (CFO).  Consistent with prior literature, we control for other 
factors shown to be associated with the probability of top management turnover including 
ineffective ICFR (Johnstone et al. 2010). 
- Insert Table 8 about here - 
 Results of estimating equation (4) are presented in Table 8. We first report the results 
including only the main effects of DPROFIT and TONE on CEO and CFO turnover (“Main 
effects” columns).  We find that insider sales profitability (DPROFIT) is significantly associated 
with the likelihood of CEO and CFO turnover. The results also indicate that top managers 
identified as lacking integrity via a weak “tone at the top” adverse internal control opinion are 
                                                 
26 We acknowledge there may be other ways to remediate weak “tone at the top” and that CEOs/CFOs will 
voluntarily leave their firms to pursue other employment opportunities or to enter retirement. Moreover, CEOs/CFOs 
may voluntarily resign or retire as a result of private negotiations with the board rather than face termination. 
Consequently, identifying the underlying reason for CEO/CFO turnover is extremely difficult, if not impossible (see 
e.g., Desai et al. 2006 for a discussion). 
27 Descriptive statistics indicate 13.9 and 21.4 percent of the CEOs and CFOs, respectively, of firms having 
ineffective ICFR (MWIC=1) leave their positions as compared to 8.0 and 9.8 percent for firms with effective ICFR 
(MWIC=0). We find the percentage of CEOs and CFOs being replaced when firms have weak “tone at the top” 
(TONE=1) increases sharply to 27.2 and 34.4 percent, respectively. All differences in frequencies are statistically 
significant (p-value<0.001). 
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more likely to leave their firms. Turning to the control variables, the positive and significant 
coefficient on MWIC in the CEO turnover and CFO turnover analysis is consistent with 
Johnstone et al. (2010). 
 Turning to the “Interaction effects” columns, we continue to find a positive and significant 
coefficient on DPROFIT in both the CEO and CFO turnover analyses whereas the main effect of 
TONE on CEO and CFO turnover disappears. However, the positive and significant coefficients 
on TONE*DPROFIT indicate that the combination of weak “tone at the top” and insider selling 
profits is incrementally associated with C-suite turnover. The average marginal effects for the 
TONE*DPROFIT interaction term are 2.43% (p-value=0.003) for CEO turnover and 2.19% (p-
value=0.014) for CFO turnover, which are economically meaningful relative to the unconditional 
probabilities of CEO turnover (8.5%) and CFO turnover (10.9%).28 Overall, these findings 
indicate that the profitability of insider selling is associated with CEOs and CFOs leaving their 
firms, and the profitability of insider selling by unethical CEOs and CFOs further increases the 
likelihood of C-suite turnover.29  
6. Summary and conclusions 
 In this study we investigate whether ineffective internal control over financial reporting 
(ICFR) is related to the profitability of insider trading. Managers are responsible for the 
effectiveness of their firms’ internal control as well as the reliability of external financial 
                                                 
28 In non-linear regression models such as a logit, the marginal effects of interaction variables depend on the values 
of the covariates. Thus, the parameter estimate for an interaction variable does not necessarily indicate the sign or 
magnitude of its marginal effect. Moreover, the statistical significance of the interaction variable cannot be assessed 
by testing whether the parameter estimate differs from zero. Therefore, we compute the marginal effect and test for 
statistical significance based on the methodology of Ai and Norton (2003). 
29To investigate whether our remediation results reported in Table 5 are driven by CEOs/CFOs who ultimately leave 
their firms’ employment, we repeat our over time analysis excluding all firm-year observations associated with any 
firm for which CEO (CFO) TURNOVER = 1 during the year internal control problems are remediated (not tabled).  
Using the reduced sample of 22,211 observations, we continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on PRE 
whereas the coefficient on POST remains insignificant, supporting our claim that general weaknesses in internal 
control are related to the profitability of insider trading. 
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reporting. These same officers are able to transfer wealth from shareholders to themselves by 
trading on their private information, which in the presence of ineffective ICFR is more extensive 
due to the potential for greater noise and bias in financial statements.  
 As predicted, we find insider trading is more profitable for firms disclosing material 
weaknesses in ICFR as required under Section 404 of SOX. The association between ICFR 
effectiveness and trading profitability is present in the years leading up to the material weakness 
disclosure, but disappears after remediation. Moreover, we find that top managers lacking 
integrity, i.e., weak “tone at the top”, earn incrementally higher insider trading profits. Results are 
driven by the profitability of share sales, consistent with managers liquidating their holdings at 
inflated share prices when financial reporting does not fully communicate management’s private 
information. Results are robust to controlling for abnormal accruals, and we find income-
increasing earnings management to enhance the profitability of insider sales in firms with weak 
“tone at the top”. We also provide evidence that weak “tone at the top” CEOs and CFOs 
engaging in more profitable insider trading are more likely to leave their firms’ employment. 
 Collectively, our results suggest that another benefit of public reporting on the effectiveness 
of ICFR is that it assists in identifying a setting where there is a greater risk of wealth transfer 
from shareholders to managers via managers selling their firms’ shares. 
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Appendix A Variable definitions 
 
Variable      Definition 
PROFIT% Aggregate profitability of officer trades during the firm-year measured as a percentage of 
market value at the beginning of the fiscal year, see equation (1) in the text for more details. 
MWIC  An indicator variable for ineffective internal control equal to one if firm reports a material 
weakness in ICFR, zero otherwise. 
TONE An indicator variable for ineffective internal control due to weak “tone at the top” equal to one 
if the auditor’s internal control report identifies a material weakness in ICFR because of “senior 
management competency, tone, reliability issues” or “ethical or compliance issues with 
personnel”, zero otherwise. 
MV  Market capitalization at fiscal year-end calculated as the product of end-of-year stock price 
(Compustat Fundamentals Annual table, data item PRCC_F) and number of shares outstanding 
(CSHO). 
BTM  Book-to-market ratio calculated as the ratio of book value of equity (CEQ) to market value of 
equity (MV) at fiscal year end. 
BHARPRE  Buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the one-year period ending one day before the first insider 
transaction by an officer during the fiscal year, calculated as the CRSP raw buy-and-hold return 
minus the average buy-and-hold return for equally sized firms using the 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ size deciles, set to zero for firm-years with no officer trading activity. 
NUMEST  Analyst following that is equal to the number of earnings forecasts (I/B/E/S) outstanding before 
the annual earnings announcement, and set to zero when missing. 
FSINFORM Financial statement informativeness computed as the adjusted R-squared from a firm-specific 
time-series regression of price per share (PRCCQ) on book value per share (CEQQ/CSHOQ) 
and earnings per share (IBQ/CSHOQ) using quarterly data from Compustat’s Fundamentals 
Quarterly table for the 20-quarter period ending with the fourth quarter of fiscal year t 
(minimum of 8 quarterly observations required). Per share amounts and numbers of shares 
outstanding are adjusted for stock splits using the ADJEX adjustment factor. 
RND An indicator variable equal to 1 if company reports non-zero R&D expenditures (XRD), zero 
otherwise. 
INST  Institutional ownership calculated as the percentage of common shares outstanding owned by 
institutional shareholders (Thomson Reuters). 
AGE Firm age measured by the number of years the company has stock price data on CRSP. 
MAG_AR The median of absolute market reactions to prior quarterly earnings announcements, where 
market reaction is measured as the cumulative abnormal return from two days before to the day 
of the earnings announcement (Huddart and Ke 2007); the median is measured over the 
(maximum) five year period ending the fiscal quarter before the end of fiscal year t. 
RETVOL The standard deviation of daily stock returns (CRSP) during the fiscal year. 
%LOSS The percentage of the most recent three years in which the company reports a loss (IB<0). 
INV  The ratio of inventory (INVT) to total assets. 
BIG4 An indicator variable equal to one if firm is audited by Big 4 auditor (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG), zero otherwise. 
SEGMENTS The number of business segments (Compustat segments file). 
FSALES  An indicator variable equal to one if firm reports foreign sales (Compustat segments file), zero 
otherwise. 
M&A An indicator variable equal to one if firm reports sales from mergers and acquisitions 
(Compustat), zero otherwise. 
RESTRUCT An indicator variable equal to one if firm reports restructuring charges (Compustat), zero 
otherwise. 
AUDITOR An indicator variable equal to one if firm has changed auditor for the current fiscal year, zero 
otherwise. 
 
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Appendix A continued. 
 
BHAR_10K The buy-and-hold abnormal stock return for the five day window centered around the 10-K 
filing date [-2, 2], where abnormal returns are computed as the difference between the raw 
CRSP return minus the average return for similar sized firms using CRSP’s 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ decile portfolios. 
BHAR_NT The buy-and-hold abnormal stock return for the five day window centered around the filing date 
of a notification of late filing on Form 12b-25 prior to the 10-K filing [-2, 2] (Audit Analytics), 
equal to zero for firms not filing a Form 12b-25. 
BHAR_RESTATE The buy-and-hold abnormal stock return for the five day window centered around the 
announcement of a restatement [-2, 2] during the period between fiscal year end and the 10-K 
filing date (Audit Analytics), equal to zero for firms not announcing a restatement. 
BHAR_8K The buy-and-hold abnormal stock return for the five day window centered around the filing date 
of an 8-K including the phrase “material weakness” [-2, 2] during the period between fiscal year 
end and the 10-K filing date for all firms where MWIC=1 (manual search through EDGAR), 
equal to zero for all other firms. 
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Table 1. 
Sample selection and summary statistics on insider trading 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Description   Firm-years Firms
Firms on Audit Analytics with a SOX 404 disclosure for years 2004-2008 20,518 5,951
   Less: no match with CRSP/Compustat   -1,887 -642
   Less: missing data items on Compustat   -907 -151
   Less: missing stock return data on CRSP   -2,057 -653
Final sample   15,667 4,505
    
 
Panel B: Summary statistics on insider trades 
Description n Mean Median
Value traded       
   Open market purchases 4,552 $618,832 $94,819
   Open market sales 10,603 $12,100,000 $2,701,191
Value traded as percentage of opening market value       
   Open market purchases 4,552 0.063% 0.016%
   Open market sales 10,603 0.619% 0.216%
 
Panel C: Internal control effectiveness over time 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Total firm-years 2,451 3,259 3,396 3,512 3,049 15,667 
 Percent ineffective internal control 17.3% 11.6% 8.8% 7.3% 3.2% 9.3% 
 
Firm-year sample consists of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms with available data on Audit Analytics, 
Compustat, and CRSP. Audit Analytics firm-years are first matched with Compustat based on CIK identifier. The 
resulting firm-year sample is matched with CRSP using the CRSP/Compustat merged table. Lastly, based on CUSIP 
identifiers, firm-years are matched with all insider transactions that occur during the fiscal year. Companies with no 
change in CUSIP are matched by CRSP’s header CUSIP. For companies that have a changing CUSIP over time, 
CRSP’s historical eight-digit CUSIP identifier (NCUSIP) is used. Ineffective internal control is identified using 
Audit Analytics.  Ineffective internal control is disclosed in the audit report accompanying the firm’s 10-K filing. 
Insider trades are the open market purchases and sales of shares as reported by officers on Table I of SEC Form 4, 
obtained from the Thomson Reuters insider filing database. Open market share purchases do not include share 
purchases through stock option exercises. Years 2004-2008 are fiscal years based on Compustat notation. 
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Table 2. 
Summary statistics for insider trading profitability and control variables 
 
Panel A: Insider trading profitability by internal control effectiveness 
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 % top decile #pos/#neg
Ineffective internal control (n=1,455) 
PROFIT% 0.0462 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0289 12.99% 1.68
Unscaled profitability $273,390 -$1,137 $0 $187,258 8.73% 

Effective internal control (n=14,212) 
PROFIT% 0.0044 -0.0042 0.0000 0.0202 9.67% 1.37
Unscaled profitability $51,263 -$34,846 $0 $214,454 10.11% 
      
 
Panel B: Insider trading determinants by internal control effectiveness 
Ineffective internal control (n=1,455) Mean St. dev. Q1 Median Q3
   ln(MVt-1) 6.239 1.323 5.250 5.976 6.967
   BTMt-1 0.489 0.317 0.260 0.437 0.664
   BHARPREt 0.035 0.476 -0.212 0.000 0.125
   NUMESTt 4.807 5.315 1 3 7
   FSINFORMt 0.376 0.292 0.129 0.365 0.619
   RNDt 0.471 0.499 0 0 1
   INSTt 0.594 0.342 0.347 0.616 0.857
   AGEt 16.910 14.158 8 12 21
   RETVOLt 0.029 0.012 0.020 0.027 0.036
   MAG_ARt 0.035 0.019 0.022 0.032 0.045
            
Effective internal control (n=14,212)      
   ln(MVt-1) 6.877 1.587 5.660 6.696 7.872
   BTMt-1 0.460 0.282 0.256 0.422 0.614
   BHARPREt 0.046 0.391 -0.155 0.000 0.150
   NUMESTt 5.455 6.227 0 3 8
   FSINFORMt 0.446 0.313 0.178 0.461 0.724
   RNDt 0.399 0.490 0 0 1
   INSTt 0.649 0.320 0.424 0.699 0.885
   AGEt 19.098 16.125 8 14 24
   RETVOLt 0.024 0.011 0.016 0.021 0.029
   MAG_ARt 0.030 0.017 0.018 0.026 0.038
 
Panel C: Market reactions to MWIC-related disclosures 
  n Mean t-stat   % <0
BHAR_10Kt 1,455 -0.35% 1.81 * 51.9%
BHAR_NTt 690 -1.98% 5.35 *** 58.1%
BHAR_RESTATEt 378 -2.30% 5.02 *** 61.4%
BHAR_8Kt 442 -1.04% 1.98 ** 51.4%
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Table 2 continued. 
 
All variables are defined as in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles of 
their distributions. Bold text indicates the difference between the mean (median) for firms with ineffective internal 
control (MWIC=1) and firms with effective internal control (MWIC=0) is significant at the 0.05 level. Differences in 
means (medians) are assessed using a t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). ***, **, and * reflect significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
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Table 3. 
Pairwise correlations 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 PROFIT%t   0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.03
2 MWICt 0.03   -0.12 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.15 0.09
3 ln(MVt-1) -0.01 -0.12  -0.21 0.04 0.55 0.12 -0.05 0.34 0.37 -0.46 -0.23
4 BTMt-1 -0.04 0.02 -0.19  -0.20 -0.20 -0.07 -0.24 -0.02 0.01 -0.14 -0.14
5 BHARPREt 0.05 -0.03 0.12 -0.19  0.04 0.13 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.15 0.13
6 NUMESTt 0.06 -0.01 0.44 -0.18 0.07  0.10 0.07 0.26 0.14 -0.16 -0.02
7 FSINFORMt -0.04 -0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.18 0.12  -0.10 0.05 0.04 -0.13 -0.07
8 RNDt 0.03 0.04 -0.07 -0.26 0.00 0.08 -0.11  0.06 0.03 0.34 0.26
9 INSTt 0.04 -0.05 0.40 -0.04 0.08 0.30 0.05 0.06   0.08 -0.17 -0.03
10 AGEt -0.03 -0.04 0.28 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.08   -0.29 -0.18
11 RETVOLt 0.05 0.14 -0.47 -0.17 0.00 -0.13 -0.13 0.34 -0.10 -0.30  0.57
12 MAG_ARt 0.03 0.10 -0.23 -0.19 0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.30 0.01 -0.17 0.62  
 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal based on a sample of 15,667 firm-year 
observations. Sample selection is described in Table 1 and all variables are defined as in Appendix A. All continuous 
variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distributions. Bold text indicates statistical significance 
at the level of 0.05 or better. 
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Table 4. 
Weak internal control and insider trading profitability 
 
Dependent variable: PROFIT%t Base model   
Controlling for  
MWIC determinants   
Controlling for  
market reactions 
  Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Test variable                       
   MWICt 0.040 *** 4.86   0.041 *** 4.88   0.037 *** 4.50 
Insider trading determinants 
   ln(MV)t-1 0.000   0.03   0.001   0.54   0.001   0.39 
   BTMt-1 -0.022 *** -2.76   -0.022 *** -2.65   -0.022 *** -2.65 
   BHARPREt 0.033 *** 3.69   0.033 *** 3.71   0.032 *** 3.66 
   ln(NUMEST)t 0.005 ** 1.97   0.005 * 1.90   0.005 * 1.89 
   FSINFORMt -0.040 *** -5.91   -0.040 *** -6.10   -0.040 *** -6.09 
   RNDt 0.003   0.39   0.005   0.57   0.005   0.57 
   INSTt -0.001   -0.10   -0.001   -0.13   -0.001   -0.11 
   ln(AGE)t 0.000   -0.05   0.001   0.18   0.001   0.21 
   RETVOLt 1.082 *** 3.55   1.039 *** 3.10   1.017 *** 3.05 
   MAG_ARt 0.062   0.28   0.058   0.26   0.052   0.24 
MWIC determinants 
   %LOSSt         0.001   0.11   -0.001   -0.11 
   INVt         0.033   1.12   0.033   1.15 
   BIG4t         -0.003   -0.41   -0.002   -0.35 
   SEGMENTSt         -0.003 ** -2.38   -0.003 ** -2.42 
   FSALESt         -0.006   -0.89   -0.005   -0.84 
   M&At         0.004   0.90   0.003   0.82 
   RESTRUCTt         0.000   -0.01   0.000   0.05 
   AUDITORt         -0.007   -0.77   -0.008   -0.81 
Market reaction variables 
   BHAR_10Kt                 -0.152 *** -5.40 
   BHAR_NTt                 -0.160 ** -2.17 
   BHAR_RESTATEt                 -0.235   -1.43 
   BHAR_8Kt                 -0.012   -0.09 
Year dummies Included   Included   Included 
Industry dummies Included   Included   Included 
n 15,667   15,667   15,667 
Adj. R2 1.76%   1.77%   2.04% 
 
OLS regressions with PROFIT% as the dependent variable. Sample selection is described in Table 1 and all variables 
are defined as in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles of their 
distributions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm-level. Year dummies are 
based on Compustat fiscal year notation. Industry dummies are based on 2-digit SIC industry classifications from 
CRSP.  ***, **, and * reflect significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 5. 
Weak internal control and insider trading profitability: Over-time analysis 
 
Dependent variable: PROFIT%t Base model   
Controlling for  
MWIC determinants   
Controlling for  
market reactions 
  Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Test variable                       
   PREt 0.032 *** 3.25   0.031 *** 3.20   0.031 *** 3.21 
   POSTt 0.000   -0.02   0.000   -0.03   0.000   -0.01 
Insider trading determinants                 
   ln(MV)t-1 -0.006 *** -3.08   -0.006 *** -2.62   -0.006 *** -2.69 
   BTMt-1 -0.014 * -1.83   -0.016 ** -2.02   -0.016 ** -1.97 
   BHARPREt 0.047 *** 4.43   0.048 *** 4.49   0.048 *** 4.47 
   ln(NUMEST)t 0.007 ** 2.36   0.007 ** 2.26   0.007 ** 2.26 
   FSINFORMt -0.052 *** -6.64   -0.051 *** -6.65   -0.050 *** -6.62 
   RNDt 0.016 * 1.77   0.014   1.58   0.014   1.55 
   INSTt 0.006   0.67   0.005   0.61   0.005   0.64 
   ln(AGE)t -0.010 *** -2.95   -0.008 ** -2.33   -0.008 ** -2.29 
   RETVOLt 0.253   0.98   0.168   0.64   0.142   0.54 
   MAG_ARt 0.465 ** 2.28   0.419 ** 1.98   0.420 ** 2.00 
MWIC determinants 
   %LOSSt         0.016 * 1.81   0.015 * 1.73 
   INVt         0.030   0.93   0.030   0.92 
   BIG4t         0.012   1.47   0.013   1.52 
   SEGMENTSt         -0.004 ** -2.52   -0.004 ** -2.54 
   FSALESt         -0.001   -0.13   -0.001   -0.11 
   M&At         0.005   1.03   0.004   0.95 
   RESTRUCTt         -0.001   -0.15   0.000   -0.10 
   AUDITORt         -0.007   -0.77   -0.008   -0.84 
Market reaction variables 
   BHAR_10Kt                 -0.086 *** -3.41 
   BHAR_NTt                 -0.148 * -1.88 
   BHAR_RESTATEt                 -0.410 * -1.70 
   BHAR_8Kt                 -0.084   -0.50 
Year dummies Included   Included   Included 
Industry dummies Included   Included   Included 
n 23,535   23,535   23,535 
Adj. R2 1.64%   1.68%   1.77% 
An analysis of the association between internal control effectiveness and insider trading profitability over time, based 
on an extended sample period including years 2002-2008. The sample described in Table 1 is augmented with firm-
years of accelerated filers (i.e., SOX 404 disclosers) before the first year of SOX 404 compliance, resulting in a 
sample of 23,535 firm-years. PRE is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years before the fiscal year of SOX 
404 assessment and for which a material weakness is subsequently disclosed (e.g., equal to one for fiscal 2002-2003 
if the firm discloses a material weakness for fiscal 2004), zero otherwise. POST is an indicator variable equal to one 
for fiscal years after remediation of material weaknesses (e.g., equal to one for fiscal year 2006 if the firm discloses a 
material weakness for fiscal 2004 and a clean opinion for fiscal 2005), zero otherwise. All other variables are defined 
as in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distributions. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm-level. Year dummies are based on 
Compustat fiscal year notation. Industry dummies are based on 2-digit SIC industry classifications from CRSP.  ***, 
**, and * reflect significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 45
Table 6. 
Insider trading profitability: “Tone at the top” 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics on insider trading profitability conditional on “tone at the top” 
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 % top decile #pos/#neg
Weak tone at the top (n=125) 
PROFIT% 0.1053 0.0000 0.0000 0.0481 16.80% 3.00
Unscaled profitability $1,008,288 $0 $0 $562,962 14.40% 3.00

Other ineffective internal control (n=1,330) 
PROFIT% 0.0406 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0280 12.63% 1.61
Unscaled profitability $204,321 -$1,797 $0 $160,558 8.20% 1.61
      
 
Panel B: “Tone at the top” and type of trades 
  Dependent variable: 
  PROFIT%  PURCHASEPROFIT%  SALESPROFIT% 
  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat
Test variables                    
   MWICt 0.032 *** 3.76  -0.001  -1.56  0.032 *** 3.87
   TONEt 0.063 ** 2.24  -0.002  -1.62  0.067 ** 2.48
Insider trading determinants Included  Included  Included 
MWIC determinants Included  Included  Included 
Market reaction variables Included  Included  Included 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included 
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included 
n 15,667  15,667  15,667 
Adj. R2 2.08%  1.41%  2.37% 
 
OLS regressions with PROFIT%, PURCHASEPROFIT%, or SALESPROFIT% as the dependent variable, where  
PROFIT%, PURCHASEPROFIT%, and SALESPROFIT% measure profits related to all insider transactions, 
purchase transactions by insiders, and sales transactions by insiders, respectively. All variables are defined as in 
Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distributions. Sample 
selection is described in Table 1 where 125 of the 1,455 ineffective internal control firm-year observations are 
identified by the audit report as having “tone at the top” internal control weaknesses (Source: Audit Analytics).  
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm-level. Year dummies are based on 
Compustat fiscal year notation. Industry dummies are based on 2-digit SIC industry classifications from CRSP.  ***, 
**, and * reflect significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 7. 
Additional analysis 
 
Panel A: Controlling for and interaction with abnormal accrual controls 
Dependent variable: SALESPROFIT%t 
  Main effects  Interaction effects 
  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat
Test variables              
   MWICt 0.034 *** 3.53  0.031 *** 2.87
   TONEt 0.077 ** 2.49  0.036   1.15
Accrual variables              
   POS_AACADJt 0.110 * 1.95  0.085   1.53
   POS_AACADJt*MWICt        0.075   0.38
   POS_AACADJt*TONEt        1.591 ** 2.14
   NEG_AACADJt 0.009   0.25  0.007   0.21
Insider trading determinants Included      Included     
MWIC determinants Included      Included     
Market reaction variables Included      Included     
Year dummies Included      Included     
Industry dummies Included      Included     
n 11,956      11,956     
Adj. R2 2.71%      2.81%     
 
Panel B:  Profitability of insider sales transactions by insider type  
Dependent variable: SALESPROFIT%t 
  CEOs/CFOs  Other officers   
Non-officer 
directors 
  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat
Test variables                     
   MWICt 0.018 *** 3.84  0.010 *** 2.92   0.006  0.89
   TONEt 0.034 ** 2.18  0.025 ** 2.14   0.031  1.50
Insider trading determinants Included  Included   Included 
MWIC determinants Included  Included   Included 
Market reaction variables Included  Included   Included 
Year dummies Included  Included   Included 
Industry dummies Included  Included   Included 
n 15,667  15,667   15,667 
Adj. R2 1.85%  2.30%   1.41% 
 
Panel A presents OLS regressions with SALESPROFIT% as the dependent variable. POS_AACADJ is the value of 
performance-adjusted abnormal accruals (Kothari et al. 2005) if positive, zero otherwise.    NEG_AACADJ is the 
value of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals (Kothari et al. 2005) if negative, zero otherwise. Panel B presents 
results for SALESPROFIT% separated by type of insider (Source: Thomson insider trading data) for the sample of 
firm-years for the period 2004-2008. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are 
winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distributions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the firm-level. Year dummies are based on Compustat fiscal year notation. Industry dummies are based 
on 2-digit SIC industry classifications from CRSP.  ***, **, and * reflect significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
level, respectively. 
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s 
o
f 
th
ei
r 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s.
 
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
 
er
ro
rs
 
ar
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
 
fo
r 
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
as
ti
ci
ty
 a
n
d
 c
lu
st
er
in
g
 a
t 
th
e 
fi
rm
-l
ev
el
. 
T
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
m
ar
g
in
al
 e
ff
ec
ts
 f
o
r 
th
e 
TO
N
E*
D
PR
O
FI
T 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 t
er
m
 a
re
 2
.4
3
%
 (
p
-v
al
u
e=
0
.0
0
3
) 
fo
r 
C
E
O
 
tu
rn
o
v
er
 a
n
d
 2
.1
9
%
 (
p
-v
al
u
e=
0
.0
1
4
) 
fo
r 
C
F
O
 t
u
rn
o
v
er
. 
T
h
e 
m
ar
g
in
al
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
te
st
s 
o
f 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
 o
f 
A
i 
an
d
 N
o
rt
o
n
 (
2
0
0
3
).
 
Y
ea
r 
d
u
m
m
ie
s 
ar
e 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 C
o
m
p
u
st
at
 f
is
ca
l 
y
ea
r 
n
o
ta
ti
o
n
. 
  
 
 
4
9
J
A
E
 9
5
9
 
T
it
le
: 
In
te
rn
a
l 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
o
v
er
 F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
R
ep
o
rt
in
g
 a
n
d
 M
a
n
a
g
er
ia
l 
R
en
t 
E
x
tr
a
ct
io
n
: 
E
v
id
en
ce
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
P
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
 o
f 
In
si
d
er
 T
ra
d
in
g
 
 H
ig
h
li
g
h
ts
 

 
W
e 
fi
n
d
 i
n
si
d
er
 t
ra
d
in
g
 t
o
 b
e 
m
o
re
 p
ro
fi
ta
b
le
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
in
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
in
te
rn
al
 c
o
n
tr
o
l.
 

 
In
cr
em
en
ta
l 
tr
ad
in
g
 p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
 d
is
ap
p
ea
rs
 a
ft
er
 w
ea
k
n
es
se
s 
ar
e 
re
m
ed
ia
te
d
. 

 
T
h
e 
p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
 o
f 
in
si
d
er
 s
al
es
 i
s 
g
re
at
er
 f
o
r 
m
an
ag
er
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ed
 a
s 
la
ck
in
g
 i
n
te
g
ri
ty
. 

 
W
e 
h
ig
h
li
g
h
t 
n
ew
 m
ar
k
et
 c
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
o
f 
in
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
in
te
rn
al
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
an
d
 w
ea
k
 t
o
n
e 
at
 t
h
e 
to
p
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